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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Global War on Terror1 has been ideologically framed as a 
struggle between the principles of freedom and democracy on the 
one hand and tyranny and extremism on the other.2  Although this 
war has arguably led to a short-term disruption of terrorist threats 
such as al-Qaeda, it has also damaged America’s image both at home 
and abroad.3  Throughout the world, there is a growing consensus 
that America has “a lack of credibility as a fair and just world lead-
er.”4  The perceived legitimacy of the United States in the War on 
Terror is critical because terrorism is not a conventional threat that 
can surrender or can be defeated in the traditional sense.  Instead, 
this battle can only be won through legitimizing the rule of law and 
undermining the use of terror as a means of political influence.5   
Although a variety of political, economic, and security policies 
have negatively impacted the perceived legitimacy of the United 
States, one of the most damaging has been the detention, treatment, 
and trial (or in many cases the lack thereof) of suspected terrorists.  
While many scholars have raised constitutional questions about the 
  
 1. The term “War on Terror” became widely used during the presidency of 
George W. Bush, however this term has proved difficult to define.  See Guy Raz, 
Defining the War on Terrorism, NPR (Nov. 1, 2006), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6416780.  The meaning of 
the “War on Terror” has evolved during conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  See id.  
With no clear beginning or end, and no traditional enemy to defeat, the “War on 
Terror” is more comparable to the “War on Drugs” or the “War on Poverty” than 
armed conflicts like World War I or World War II.   Id. 
 2. Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic Choice: 
Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 87, 87 (2008). 
 3. See STEVEN R. CORMAN ET AL., CONSORTIUM FOR STRATEGIC COMMC’N, 
CREDIBILITY IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES AND 
RESEARCH AGENDA 3 (2006), available at http://comops.org/article/117.pdf. 
 4. See id. at 3–4. 
 5. Lunday & Rishikof, supra note 2, at 89–90. 
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legality of U.S. detention procedures,6 this article offers a psycholog-
ical perspective of legitimacy in the context of detention.  
I begin with a discussion of the psychology of terrorism.  Next, I 
argue that the U.S. response to terrorism has been largely perceived 
as excessive, which has undermined global perceptions of U.S. legi-
timacy.  I address this issue by drawing on a well-established body 
of social psychology research that proposes “a causal chain in which 
procedural fairness leads to perceived legitimacy, which leads to the 
acceptance of policies.”7  In other words, the fairness of the proce-
dures through which individuals are detained and tried will signifi-
cantly affect the perceived legitimacy of U.S. conduct in the War on 
Terror.  In contrast to current detention policies, which have largely 
been implemented in an ad hoc manner, I suggest that procedural 
fairness can be increased through the establishment of a domestic 
terror court specifically designed to try detainees.  Finally, I balance 
fairness with the competing values of effectiveness and efficiency to 
provide a framework through which U.S. legitimacy in the War on 
Terror can be enhanced. 
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM  
Terrorism can be defined as “politically motivated violence, per-
petrated by individuals, groups, or state-sponsored agents, intended 
to instill feelings of terror and helplessness in a population in order 
to influence decision making and to change behavior.”8  Contrary to 
common belief, terrorism cannot be explained by economic depriva-
tion, lack of education, or increased psychopathology.9  Instead, “ter-
rorism can best be understood through a focus on the psychological 
  
 6. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Juris-
diction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2029, 2031 
(2007); Tamara Huckert, The Undetermined Fate of the Guantanamo Bay Detai-
nees’ Habeas Corpus Petitions, 9 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 236, 237 (2006); Johan Steyn, 
Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (2004).  
 7. Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged 
Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 180 (2005). 
 8. Fathali M. Moghaddam, The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Explo-
ration, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 161, 161 (2005). 
 9. Id. 
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interpretation of material conditions and the options seen to be avail-
able to overcome perceived injustices, particularly those in the pro-
cedures through which decisions are made.”10  In the context of radi-
cal Islamist terrorism, the United States is viewed as a threat to Is-
lamic identity and culture in a world that is becoming increasingly 
secularized and modernized.11 
Though the root structural, motivational, and triggering causes of 
terrorism are multifaceted and nuanced, scholars generally agree that 
acts of terrorism can be traced back to “perceived intolerable injus-
tice.”12  Fathali M. Moghaddam conceptualizes the psychological 
process leading to terrorism as a journey up a narrowing staircase 
that culminates in a terrorist act.13  On the ground floor exists a large 
group of individuals who are experiencing injustice and relative de-
privation.14  Consequently, a few of these individuals begin to climb 
the staircase in search of solutions.15  If these individuals are unable 
to address their needs through legitimate means, they will experience 
anger and frustration that they will seek to displace against those 
perceived to be responsible.16  As individuals climb higher, they be-
gin to see terrorism as a legitimate strategy reflecting their only 
means to address injustice.17  Ultimately, individuals become fully 
engaged in an “us versus them” mindset that justifies acts of vi-
olence against civilians to further a cause.18  In the same way that 
  
 10. Id.; see also TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: 
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 218 (2002). 
 11. See Michael Freeman, Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: 
A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Policy, 31 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 40, 41 
(2008). 
 12. Laurence Miller, The Terrorist Mind, 50 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & 
COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 121, 121 (2006); see also Andrew Silke, Fire of Iolaus: The 
Role of State Countermeasures in Causing Terrorism and What Needs to Be Done, 
in ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM: MYTHS, REALITY, AND WAYS FORWARD 246 
(Tore Bjorgo ed., 2005); Freeman, supra note 11, at 41; Tim Krieger & Daniel 
Meierrieks, What Causes Terrorism? 4 (Ctr. for Int’l Econs., Working Paper No. 
12, 2008). 
 13. Moghaddam, supra note 8, at 161. 
 14. Id. at 162. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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soldiers depersonalize the enemy, terrorists are instructed to over-
come the inhibitory mechanisms that would normally prevent vi-
olence against innocent civilians.19 
This psychological model for understanding terrorism is critical 
in responding to individuals at different points on the hypothetical 
staircase.  The use of criminal law as a response to terrorism has 
been widely criticized for addressing individuals only on the top step 
who have already committed a terrorist act.20  In response, the pre-
ventive military detention model originally implemented by the 
Bush Administration has cast a wide net over thousands of individu-
als alleged to have any sort of terrorist connection.21  Nevertheless, 
as former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted, terrorist 
organizations are “churning out new terrorists faster than the United 
States can kill or capture them.”22  Paradoxically, some research 
suggests that U.S. detention policies have actually served to legitim-
ize, rather than deter, extremists.23  In the next section, I suggest that 
the United States has alienated an essential group: the millions of 
individuals near the bottom of the staircase who are weighing the 
legitimacy of terrorist organizations on the one hand against the legi-
timacy of U.S. policies in the War on Terror on the other hand. 
III. THE CURRENT U.S. DETENTION REGIME: WHEN EXCESS 
CREATES INJUSTICE 
History has demonstrated that in times of crisis, nation-states 
frequently err by allowing national security to trump individual li-
berties.24  In such situations, political leaders rush to modify or dis-
card the normal rules of law.25  As Justice Brennan noted: 
  
 19. Moghaddam, supra note 8, at 162. 
 20. See, e.g., Lunday & Rishikof, supra note 2, at 101–03. 
 21. See Jules Lobel, The Preventive Paradigm and the Perils of Ad Hoc Balanc-
ing, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1420–21 (2007). 
 22. Dave Moniz & Tom Squitieri, After Grim Rumsfeld Memo, White House 
Supports Him, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/news/wash 
ington/2003-10-22-defense-memo-usat_x.htm.  
 23. See Lunday & Rishikof, supra note 2, at 90–93. 
 24. Lobel, supra note 21, at 1411–14. 
 25. Id.  
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After each perceived security crisis ended, the United States 
has remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil liberties 
was unnecessary.  But it has proven unable to prevent itself 
from repeating the error when the next crisis came along.26   
Consequently, when the current legal framework appears insuffi-
cient, the stage is set for impromptu, crisis-based decision-making.  
Inevitably, a sort of ad hoc balancing is substituted in place of for-
mal rules of law leading to excess in the forms of “judgments based 
on suspicion and not hard evidence” and the jettisoning of “checks 
on unilateral decision making.”27  The internment of over 100,000 
Japanese Americans without an evidentiary basis during World War 
II is one of the most notorious examples of governmental overreach 
in a period of crisis.28  However, the later congressional acknowled-
gement that these “actions were taken without adequate security rea-
sons” and instead were primarily based on “racial prejudice, wartime 
hysteria, and a failure of political leadership” reflects the current 
sentiment of millions of Muslims towards U.S. detention policies.29 
Today, many individuals throughout the world question whether 
the United States has engaged in excess in response to the attacks of 
9/11.  A 2004 poll suggests that many people in France (57%), Ger-
many (49%), and Britain (33%) felt that the United States over-
reacted in response to terrorism.30  Among Middle Eastern countries, 
as many as three-fourths of individuals stated that the United States 
overreacted in the War on Terror.31  Additionally, approximately 
two-thirds of citizens in France, Germany, Turkey, and Pakistan 
questioned the sincerity of the United States in the War on Terror.32  
Within the United States, nationwide confidence in the White House 
  
 26. William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct., The Quest to Develop a 
Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crises, Speech at the Law 
School of Hebrew University, Jerusalem (Dec. 22, 1987), http://www.hofstra.edu/ 
PDF/law_civil_hafetz_article1.pdf. 
 27. Lobel, supra note 21, at 1413. 
 28. See id. at 1411–12. 
 29. Steyn, supra note 6, at 1–2, 8. 
 30. THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, A YEAR AFTER 
IRAQ WAR, MISTRUST OF AMERICA IN EUROPE EVER HIGHER, MUSLIM ANGER 
PERSISTS 2 (2004), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/206.pdf. 
 31. Id. 
 32. CORMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 3. 
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dropped 40% between 2002 and 2004 while confidence in Congress 
fell by 25% during this period.33  Although this worldwide drop in 
legitimacy is the result of multiple factors beyond the scope of this 
paper, such as the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, detention remains a 
controversial topic that continues to negatively affect global percep-
tions of the United States.   
Although this paper focuses specifically on the detention of sus-
pected terrorists at the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp (Guanta-
namo Bay),34 this facility is but one of many detention centers hold-
ing suspected terrorists on behalf of the United States.35  Today, ap-
proximately 250 prisoners (out of approximately 800) remain at this 
U.S.-run military base in Cuba that is outside U.S. legal jurisdic-
tion.36  However, it is critical to note that these 250 individuals 
represent a mere 1% of “approximately 25,000 detainees worldwide 
held directly or indirectly by or on behalf of the United States.”37  
Prisoners have alleged torture, sexual degradation, religious persecu-
tion,38 and many other specific forms of mistreatment while being 
detained.39  In many detention facilities including Guantanamo Bay, 
Abu Ghraib, and Bagram, these allegations are substantiated by sig-
nificant evidence and have gained worldwide attention.40 
  
 33. Id. 
 34. See generally Guantanamo Bay [GTMO] “GITMO,” 
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantan 
amo-bay.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2011) (discussing the history of Guantanamo 
Bay).  
 35. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Is Bagram the New Guantánamo? Habeas Corpus 
and Maqaleh v. Gates, ASIL INSIGHTS (June 17, 2009), http://www.asil.org/in 
sights090618.cfm. 
 36. See Officials: Taliban’s New Top Operations Officer Is Former Guantanamo 
Bay Detainee, FOX NEWS (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,508506,00.html. 
 37. Amos N. Guiora, Creating a Domestic Terror Court, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 
617, 625 (2009). 
 38. Adam Zagorin, Exclusive: Charges Sought Against Rumsfeld Over Prison 
Abuse, TIME, Nov. 10, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816, 
1557842,00.html. 
 39. See, e.g., Tipton Three Complain of Beatings, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3509750.stm. 
 40. See, e.g., SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 
TO ABU GHRAIB 20 (2004). 
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While some graphic and shocking cases of abuse have been 
brought to light,41 a more typical example is the prosecution of six-
teen-year-old Mohamed Jawad by Lt. Col. Darrel Vandeveld at 
Guantanamo Bay.42  At first, the case against Jawad looked 
straightforward, as he had confessed to throwing a grenade that in-
jured two U.S. soldiers and a translator in December 2002.43  How-
ever, a deeper investigation “uncovered a confession obtained 
through torture, two suicide attempts by the accused, abusive inter-
rogations, the withholding of exculpatory evidence from the de-
fense,” and other procedural problems.44  Vandeveld discovered that 
the military had obtained confessions from two other individuals for 
the same offense; he ultimately left his post after attempts to provide 
“basic fair trial rights” failed.45 
In February 2006, the United Nations Working Group on Arbi-
trary Detention spoke out against international law and human rights 
violations at Guantanamo Bay, stating that the facility should be 
closed “without further delay.”46  This report paralleled earlier criti-
cism from Amnesty International that Guantanamo Bay violates 
minimum standards for the treatment of individuals.47  In response, 
the United States has argued that detainees are not prisoners of war 
but are rather “unlawful combatants” who are not entitled to the pro-
tections of the Geneva Convention because they do not act in accor-
  
 41. See id. at 39–40. 
 42. Andy Worthington, Former Insider Shatters Credibility of Military Commis-
sions, Describes Brutal Treatment of Teenage Detainee, ALTERNET (July 13, 
2009), http://www.alternet.org/rights/141267/former_insider_shatters_credibility_ 
of_military_commissions,_describes_brutal_treatment_of_teenage_detainee. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Commission on Human Rights: Independent Experts Issue Report on Guan-
tanamo Detainees, UN NEWS CENTER (Feb. 16, 2006), http://www.un.org/apps/ 
news/story.asp?NewsID=17523&Cr=Guant%E1namo&Cr1=Bay. 
 47. AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE THREAT OF A BAD 
EXAMPLE: UNDERMINING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AS “WAR ON TERROR” 
DETENTIONS CONTINUE 21 (2003), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ 
AMR51/114/2003/en/48a8fe0c-d6a7-11dd-ab95-a13b602c0642/amr51114200 
3en.pdf [hereinafter THREAT OF A BAD EXAMPLE]. 
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dance with the accepted rules of war.48  Yet, regardless of the debat-
able legal merit of this argument, legitimacy is an “elusive quality” 
grounded in worldwide opinion that will not let the United States off 
the hook on a mere technicality when moral duties and international 
customs have been violated.49  In the next section, I discuss the im-
portance of legitimacy and the ways in which it has been under-
mined by U.S. conduct in the War on Terror.  By understanding 
what drives global perceptions of U.S. legitimacy, current detention 
policies and their ramifications can be more accurately assessed and 
restructured. 
IV. LEGITIMACY: THE CRITICAL MISSING ELEMENT IN THE WAR ON 
TERROR 
In the context of the War on Terror, legitimacy is the critical 
missing element under the current U.S. detention regime.  Legitima-
cy can be defined as “a psychological property of an authority, insti-
tution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to be-
lieve that it is appropriate, proper, and just.”50  As far back as Plato 
and Aristotle, philosophers have recognized that influencing others 
merely through coercion and power is costly and inefficient.51  To-
day, empirical evidence suggests that legitimacy, rather than deter-
rence, is primarily what causes individuals to obey the law.52  Thus, 
while legal authorities may possess the immediate power to stop il-
legal action, long-term compliance requires that the general public 
perceives the law to be legitimate.53  Terrorism is primarily an ideo-
  
 48. Pamela M. von Ness, Guantanamo Bay Detainees: National Security or Civil 
Liberty, U.S. ARMY WAR C. 5 (2003), http://www.pegc.us/archive/DoD/docs/ 
vonness.pdf. 
 49. Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson, The Sources of American Legi-
timacy, 83 FOREIGN AFFS. 18, 18–19 (2004), available at http://www.jstor.org/ 
pss/20034134. 
 50. Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 
57 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 375, 375 (2006) [hereinafter Tyler, Psychological Perspec-
tives]. 
 51. Id. at 376. 
 52. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 60 (1990) [hereinafter TYLER, 
OBEY THE LAW]. 
 53. Id. at 63. 
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logical war that cannot be won by technology that is more sophisti-
cated or increased military force.54  While nations combating terror-
ism must continue to address immediate threats by detaining sus-
pected terrorists, they must also consider the prevention of future 
threats by analyzing how their policies are perceived by individuals 
throughout the world.  Ultimately, in the War on Terror, “the bene-
fits to be derived from maximizing legitimacy are too important to 
neglect.”55   
Over time, perceptions of legitimacy create a “reservoir of sup-
port” for an institution that goes beyond mere self-interest.56  In the 
context of government: 
Legitimacy is [an] endorphin of the democratic body politic; 
it is the substance that oils the machinery of democracy, re-
ducing the friction that inevitably arises when people are not 
able to get everything they want from politics.  Legitimacy is 
loyalty; it is a reservoir of goodwill that allows the institu-
tions of government to go against what people may want at 
the moment without suffering debilitating consequences.57 
The widespread acceptance of highly controversial decisions by 
the U.S. Supreme Court illustrates the power of institutional legiti-
macy.58  The Court itself noted that it “cannot buy support for its 
decisions by spending money and, except to a minor degree, it can-
not independently coerce obedience to its decrees.”59  “The Court’s 
power lies, rather, in its legitimacy . . . .”60  For example, by empha-
sizing “equal treatment,” “honesty and neutrality,” “gathering infor-
mation before decision making,” and “making principled, or rule 
based, decisions instead of political decisions,” the Court maintained 
  
 54. Moghaddam, supra note 8, at 168. 
 55. Gregory S. McNeal, Institutional Legitimacy and Counterterrorism Trials, 
43 U. RICH. L. REV. 967, 967 (2009). 
 56. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 50, at 381. 
 57. JAMES L. GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A 
DIVIDED NATION? 289 (2004). 
 58. Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of 
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion 
Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 780 (1994). 
 59. Id. at 714. 
 60. Id. 
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legitimacy through the controversial abortion case Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey in 1992.61  Thus, al-
though approximately half of Americans oppose abortion,62 the vast 
majority of these individuals give deference to the Court’s ruling on 
this issue.63 
In the post-World War II era, the United States built up a world-
wide reservoir of support based upon four pillars: “its commitment 
to international law, its acceptance of consensual decision-making, 
its reputation for moderation, and its identification with the preserva-
tion of peace.”64  Although some U.S. policies between 1950 and 
2001 did not align with these pillars, on a whole the United States 
legitimized itself as a world superpower during this period.65  In the 
1980s, President Ronald Reagan spoke of America as a “shining city 
on a hill,” suggesting that it was a model for the nations of the world 
to look to.66  While the United States received a virtually unprece-
dented outpouring of support from the international community fol-
lowing 9/11, a nation’s reservoir of support will quickly evaporate 
when its government overreacts.  Across the globe, individuals have 
expressed a growing dissatisfaction with U.S. conduct in the War on 
Terror, and by 2006, even western allies of the United States lobbied 
for the immediate closure of Guantanamo Bay, calling it “an embar-
rassment.”67  Former Secretary of State Colin Powell proclaimed that 
“Guantanamo has become a major, major problem . . . in the way the 
world perceives America and if it were up to me I would close 
Guantanamo not tomorrow but this afternoon . . . .”68  Similarly, 
  
 61. 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 58, at 749. 
 62. Abortion and Birth Control, POLLING REPORT, http://www.pollingre 
port.com/abortion.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2011). 
 63. See id. 
 64. Tucker & Hendrickson, supra note 49, at 24. 
 65. See id. at 19–23. 
 66. RONALD REAGAN, A SHINING CITY: THE LEGACY OF RONALD REAGAN 178 
(D. Erik Felten ed., 1998). 
 67. France Calls Guantanamo ‘An Embarrassment,’ EXPATICA (Feb. 20, 2006), 
http://www.expatica.com/fr/news/local_news/france-calls-guantanamo-an-
embarrassment-27768.html. 
 68. Colin Powell Says Guantanamo Should Be Closed, REUTERS (June 10, 
2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1043646920070610. 
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President Obama noted in his campaign that “Guantanamo has be-
come a recruiting tool for our enemies.”69 
Current U.S. detention policies erode each of the four pillars on 
which the United States established global legitimacy.  In fact, critics 
have argued that the “United States has assumed many of the very 
features of the ‘rogue nations’ against which it has rhetorically—and 
sometimes literally—done battle over the years.”70  While legitimacy 
cannot be regained overnight, the recent election of President Barack 
Obama presents a critical opportunity for a re-articulation of U.S. 
detention policies.  Although President Obama issued an executive 
order calling for the closure of Guantanamo Bay only two days after 
being sworn into office,71 significant controversy remains about the 
kind of alternate detention system that will replace it.72  In contrast 
to the current model, which has largely rendered inefficient decisions 
based on ad hoc policies, I argue for the establishment of a domestic 
terror court (DTC) created specifically to deal with the unique pro-
cedural issues created by a growing number of suspected terrorists. 
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
In the context of detentions, “the fairness of the procedures” 
through which the United States exercises authority is the key ele-
ment driving both national and international perceptions of U.S. legi-
timacy, and legitimacy ultimately determines the extent to which 
individuals comply with U.S. policies.73  Robust empirical evidence 
has “repeatedly documented a pattern of correlations consistent with 
a causal chain in which procedural fairness leads to perceived legi-
timacy, which leads to the acceptance of policies.”74  Research also 
  
 69. Promises to Keep: Candidate Obama vs. President Obama, FOX NEWS (Nov. 
1, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/10/23/pub-obama-campaign-
promises/ [hereinafter Promises to Keep].  
 70. Tucker & Hendrickson, supra note 49, at 28. 
 71. See Promises to Keep, supra note 69. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 50, at 382. 
 74. MacCoun, supra note 7, at 180; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural 
Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004) (noting that the concept of procedural 
justice is “deeply entwined with the old and powerful idea that a process that guar-
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suggests that procedural justice creates a “willingness to empower 
legal authorities to resolve issues of public controversy.”75  An anal-
ysis of how procedural justice has been applied in legal and institu-
tional settings provides a framework for addressing the specific legi-
timacy problems associated with Guantanamo Bay and how fair 
process can be effectively incorporated into a DTC model. 
Thirty-five years ago, the formal study of procedural justice was 
born when researchers discovered that individuals “care deeply 
about the fairness of the process that is used to resolve their encoun-
ter or dispute, separate and apart from their interest in achieving a 
favorable outcome.”76  This research indicates that individuals with 
control over the process (e.g., telling their side of the story, present-
ing evidence, and controlling the order and timing of presentation) 
view the process itself as fair.77  This outcome, known as the fair 
process effect, “is one of the most replicated findings in the [proce-
dural] justice literature.”78  A meta-analysis of 120 empirical justice 
studies covering a twenty-five year period revealed that procedural 
justice is highly correlated with outcome satisfaction (.48), institu-
tional commitment (.57), trust (.61), and evaluation of authority 
(.64).79  These findings indicate the degree of significance that pro-
cedural justice has on individuals.  
In the legal setting, an exploration of procedural justice in felony 
cases revealed that defendants’ evaluations of the judicial system did 
not depend exclusively on the favorability of sentencing.80  Even 
when verdicts involved incarceration and serious sanctions, litigant 
  
antees rights of meaningful participation is an essential prerequisite for the legiti-
mate authority of action-guiding legal norms”). 
 75. Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 58, at 799. 
 76. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotia-
tion: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 L. 
& SOC. INQUIRY 473, 477 (2008).  See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS 
WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). 
 77. Jason A. Colquitt et al., Justice at the Millennium: A Meta-Analytic Review 
of 25 Years of Organizational Justice Research, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 425, 426 
(2001). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 434–35. 
 80. See Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 L. & 
SOC. REV. 483, 483 (1988). 
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evaluations went beyond distributive outcomes to analyze their per-
ceptions of the procedural fairness of the legal system.81  Additional-
ly, while judges handling minor cases believed that litigants would 
ignore procedural issues when granted favorable outcomes, litigants’ 
concerns over process led to unanticipated hostilities when proce-
dural shortcuts were used by the court to resolve cases.82  Thus, 
while outcomes cannot be entirely disregarded, the fairness of the 
process used to reach a given outcome is critical to perceptions of 
legitimacy. 
Recent research highlights two reasons why procedural justice 
may be particularly important in the context of detentions.  First, 
judgments of procedural fairness are particularly important to indi-
viduals experiencing uncertainty.83  Detainees lack the procedural 
certainties guaranteed in a regular criminal proceeding in that they 
frequently do not know how long they will be held, why they are 
being held, what evidence exists against them, and what degree of 
punishment they may face.84  Second, the greater the unfavorable-
ness of the outcome and the larger the potential harm, the more indi-
viduals care about fair process.85  These findings are reflected in 
U.S. criminal law provisions requiring certain elements of procedur-
al due process when serious sanctions are involved.86 
It is also critical to extend procedural justice judgments beyond 
the individual detainee to the perspective of a worldwide audience.  
While it is easy to overlook how an alleged terrorist feels about the 
degree of procedural fairness he or she is receiving, the perceptions 
  
 81. Id. at 503. 
 82. Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of 
Their Courtroom Experience, 18 L. & SOC. REV. 51, 69–71 (1984) [hereinafter 
Tyler, Perceived Injustice]. 
 83. E. Allan Lind & Kees van den Bos, When Fairness Works: Toward a Gener-
al Theory of Uncertainty Management, 24 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 181, 
184 (2002). 
 84. See Some Guantanamo Bay Detainees May Be Held Indefinitely, VOANEWS 
(July 10, 2009), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-07-10-voa6-
68789562.html. 
  85. JOEL BROCKNER, A CONTEMPORARY LOOK AT ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE: 
MULTIPLYING INSULT TIMES INJURY 75 (2010). 
 86. RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 99–100 (2004). 
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of governments, human rights organizations, political groups (in-
cluding terrorist organizations), and millions of individuals (particu-
larly those who closely identify with that individual’s race, religion, 
or nationality) cannot be ignored.  Individuals become upset when 
they observe unfairness, and such observations motivate them to 
help victims of this unfairness.87  Thus, it would be a mistake to 
think that procedural injustice against a single individual will affect 
the perceptions of that individual alone.88  Additionally, efforts to 
hide procedural injustices, such as the abuse of detainees by U.S. 
soldiers,89 have only backfired by creating sympathy for the types of 
individuals that the United States seeks to dehumanize.90  In the next 
section, I identify six rules of procedural justice, evaluate the current 
detention regime based on these rules, and make recommendations 
about how these rules could be implemented in a DTC model.   
VI. APPLYING PROCEDURAL JUSTICE TO U.S. DETENTION POLICIES 
While an extensive theoretical review of procedural justice is 
beyond the scope of this paper, I use six rules of procedural justice 
as defined in Beyond Fairness: A Theory of Allocation Prefe-
rences,
91
 in analyzing procedural justice under the current detention 
regime.  These rules are as follows:  (1) the consistency rule—
allocation procedures should be consistent across persons and over 
time; (2) the bias suppression rule—personal self interest in the allo-
cation process should be prevented; (3) the accuracy rule—decisions 
must be based on accurate information; (4) the correctability rule—
opportunities must exist to enable decisions to be modified; (5) the 
representativeness rule—the allocation process must represent the 
concerns of all recipients; and (6) the ethicality rule—allocations 
must be based on prevailing moral and ethical standards.92 
  
 87. BROCKNER, supra note 85, at 33. 
 88. Id. at 33–35. 
 89. HERSH, supra note 40, at 19–20. 
 90.  See LARRY J. SIEGEL, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 179–80 (12th ed. 
2010).  
 91. Gerald S. Leventhal et al., Beyond Fairness: A Theory of Allocation Prefe-
rences, in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 167 (Gerold Mikula ed., 1980). 
 92. Id. at 195–96; TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra note 52, at 118.  
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An examination of each of these procedural rules reveals a varie-
ty of ways in which the procedural justice accorded detainees can be 
enhanced.  Given the growing nature of terrorism as a persistent 
global threat, additional strategic consideration must be given to how 
these rules will be applied to a more permanent judicial process for 
detainees.  The DTC model that I propose is a hybrid court incorpo-
rating many of the procedural safeguards of the U.S. criminal justice 
system into a model specifically designed to meet the unique chal-
lenges posed in trying alleged terrorists.93  While other scholars have 
already laid out the legal framework of the DTC model,94 I consider 
the degree to which this model incorporates the six rules of proce-
dural justice.  Ultimately, the DTC model provides a concrete 
framework of fair process, while also maximizing effectiveness and 
efficiency to a greater extent than either the current U.S. detention 
regime or competing detention models.  
A.  Consistency 
The rule of consistency requires that all parties have the same 
rights and that individuals receive equal treatment.95  Consistency 
over time is also important, and, thus, procedural changes must be 
made carefully in a way that puts individuals on notice.96  Conse-
quently, two defendants prosecuted with identical evidence should 
ultimately receive the same outcome regardless of any differing, but 
irrelevant, personal characteristics or the timing of the crime.97  
However, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 shocked the world and instant-
ly changed U.S. policies on terrorism.98  While significant steps to 
increase national security were certainly warranted, a rapid discard 
of traditional rules of law undermined the principle of consistency. 
For example, the “Post-9/11 Immigrant Roundup” in the United 
States of over 1,200 Arab and Muslim immigrants marked a dramat-
  
 93. See Guiora, supra note 37, at 619. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Leventhal et al., supra note 91, at 195. 
 96. See TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra note 52, at 118–19.   
 97. See id. 
 98. Lobel, supra note 21, at 1419–420. 
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ic legal change fueled by perceived necessity.99  In this instance, At-
torney General John Ashcroft “substituted a vague standard for a 
clear rule in order to justify holding [these immigrants] without 
charges for extended periods of time.”100  Under U.S. criminal law, 
these individuals would have been charged within twenty-four hours, 
while the more expansive Patriot Act allows for a seven-day deten-
tion based on reasonable grounds in the belief that an immigrant is 
engaged in terrorist activities.101  However, new regulations permit-
ted many of these individuals to be held for months.102  Neverthe-
less, two years later, an analysis of the roundup by the Michigan Pol-
icy Institute revealed that “[w]e haven’t learned anything about pre-
empting terrorism in America, but we have intimidated, antagonized 
and alienated many (minority) communities . . . .”103 
Similarly, the United States sidestepped international laws relat-
ing to the detention of prisoners of war by labeling suspected terror-
ists as “unlawful enemy combatants.”104  “Until 2001, this term ap-
peared nowhere in U.S. criminal law, international law, or the law of 
war,” however, it has subsequently been vaguely construed and ap-
plied to hold individuals indefinitely without charges.105  An addi-
tional consistency problem is that this ambiguous definition would 
cover Osama bin Laden, as well as “a ‘little old lady in Switzerland 
who writes checks to what she thinks is a charity that helps orphans 
in Afghanistan but really is a front to finance al-Qaeda activities,’ 
[and] a person who teaches English to the son of an al-Qaeda mem-
ber.”106 
The principle of equal rights suggests that individuals suspected 
of terrorism should be treated in the same manner whether they are 
U.S. citizens or citizens of another nation.107  In Boumediene v. 
  
 99. See Jim Lobe, Post-9/11 Immigrant Roundup Backfired—Report, INTER 
PRESS SERVICE (June 26, 2003), http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=19000.  
100. Lobel, supra note 21, at 1419–420. 
101. Id. at 1420. 
102. Id. 
103. Lobe, supra note 99. 
104. Lobel, supra note 21, at 1420. 
105. Id. at 1420–22. 
106. Id. at 1421. 
107. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, THE RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS, at 7–13, U.N. Sales No. E.07.XIV.2 
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Bush,108 the U.S. Supreme Court challenged two previously accepted 
distinctions that undermine the principle of consistency.109  “The 
first is the distinction between the constitutional rights of American 
and alien prisoners; the second is the distinction between the rights 
of those we imprison on American soil and those we imprison eve-
rywhere else in the world.”110  As a result, the idea that there is “no 
moral justification for discriminating against foreigners” in detention 
procedures is gaining momentum.111  However, to some extent this 
principle has been overshadowed by separate agreements regarding 
the treatment of individuals from certain nations.112  For example, 
the Attorney General has promised the British government that its 
citizens will not face the death penalty.113  While special treatment 
may induce the cooperation of an ally, it does so with an associated 
cost imposed on the citizens of other nations.  In contrast, efforts by 
the U.S. Supreme Court to grant habeas corpus rights to all detainees 
regardless of citizenship or place of capture enhance perceptions of 
consistency.114 
To further improve perceptions of U.S. consistency, I suggest: 
(1) that traditional rules of law may need to be modified, but cannot 
be abruptly discarded in periods of crisis; (2) a general uniformity 
among military commissions must exist as required by the U.S. Su-
preme Court; and (3) detainees of different nations, ethnicities, and 
religions must be given equal treatment and equal rights.  The DTC 
model addresses each of these three concerns. 
First, the DTC model sets a clear standard of consistency in con-
trast to current ad hoc policies that have fluctuated in the political 
winds of this crisis and have been vaguely applied.  The DTC model 
provides clear definitions and specific criteria for determining who is 
a threat based on information that is “(1) reliable; (2) viable; (3) va-
  
(2006), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/noncitizensen. 
pdf. 
108. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
109. See id. at 739. 
110. Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, 55 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, No. 13, 
Aug. 14, 2008, at 2. 
111. See id. 
112. See Steyn, supra note 6, at 9. 
113. Id. 
114. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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lid; and (4) corroborated.”115  When individuals are not on notice 
about how they will be treated, they respond negatively when the 
law appears to implicate their conduct without adequate warning.116  
Outside observers such as human rights groups and citizens of other 
nations will similarly be dissatisfied by a system that generates un-
predictable results. 
Second, the DTC model provides a system of uniformity as re-
quired by the U.S. Supreme Court.  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,117 the 
Court proclaimed the need for a uniform system of courts-martial 
and military commission procedures.118  As a result, procedural rules 
must be consistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and 
rules must be the same between military commissions and courts-
martial “insofar as practicable.”119  The DTC model proposes un-
iformity in terms of sentencing as well as procedure.  Like the U.S. 
criminal justice system, the DTC model utilizes maximum and min-
imum sentencing terms.120  Additionally, the DTC model rejects the 
death penalty in all cases rather than providing exceptions to the citi-
zens of certain nations.121 
Third, the DTC model provides the same treatment for citizens 
and non-citizens.  A 2006 poll suggests that even Americans gener-
ally do not feel that their fellow citizens deserve preferential treat-
ment.122  Sixty-three percent of respondents indicated that the deten-
tion policies should be the same for citizens and non-citizens, while 
33% felt that policies should be different.123  When granting U.S. 
citizens additional rights that are not applied to individuals of other 
nations, a tradeoff is clearly being made.  One of the fears surround-
ing U.S. treatment of foreign detainees is that other nations will reci-
  
115. Guiora, supra note 37, at 631. 
116. See generally Tyler, Perceived Injustice, supra note 82. 
117. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
118. McNeal, supra note 55, at 999. 
119. Id. at 972–73, 999. 
120. Guiora, supra note 37, at 631–32. 
121. Id. at 632. 
122. Americans Support Full Due-Process Rights for Terrorism Suspects, WORLD 
PUBLIC OPINION (July 17, 2006), http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/ 
home_page/228.php?nid=&id=&pnt=228&lb=hmpg1. 
123. Id. 
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procate by treating U.S. prisoners with disrespect.124  The application 
of standard rights and procedures to similarly situated individuals 
under the DTC model comports with universal conceptions of fair-
ness and also enhances the next procedural justice factor: bias sup-
pression. 
B.  Bias Suppression 
The prevention of favoritism, prejudice, and external bias is a 
critical aspect of procedural justice.125  Two types of biases are: (1) 
“a vested interest in the outcome” and (2) “[reliance] on prior views 
rather than evidence.”126  To illustrate, a judge conducting the trial of 
a close family member has a strong personal interest in the trial’s 
outcome.  Similarly, a jury member who believes all criminal defen-
dants are probably guilty will likely render a biased decision that is 
not based on evidence.127  Perhaps what is most critical to the bias-
suppression analysis in the context of terrorism is the extent to which 
the deck is stacked against the detainee from the beginning.  Under 
U.S. criminal law, a defendant can present his or her case to a jury of 
peers, remove biased individuals from the jury pool, examine all the 
evidence presented by the prosecutor, object to certain forms of pre-
judicial evidence such as hearsay, cross examine witnesses, and re-
quire that the charges be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.128  In a 
detainee’s trial, none of these procedural safeguards exist, and, thus, 
an important concern arises as to how impartiality can be main-
tained.129 
At the start of this analysis, a government must ask itself whether 
it is willing to let an individual go if the evidence required for a con-
viction is not present.  For example, one of the questions surround-
  
124. See SUE MAHAN & PAMALA L. GRISET, TERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVE 324 
(2nd ed. 2008). 
125. See TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra note 52, at 119. 
126. See id. 
127. See id. 
128. See generally PAUL BERGMAN & SARA J. BERMAN, THE CRIMINAL LAW 
HANDBOOK: KNOW YOUR RIGHTS, SURVIVE THE SYSTEM (Richard Stim ed., 11th 
ed. 2009). 
129. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 337, 341 (2002). 
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ing the famous Nuremberg trials of Nazi leaders following World 
War II was the extent to which the international tribunal was driven 
by victor’s justice.130  While many argued for “show trials” or pro-
ceedings that were “not too judicial,”131 others, such as Justice Ro-
bert Jackson, believed that procedural fairness was essential to ulti-
mate victory (in contrast to the punitive Treaty of Versailles at the 
end of World War I).132  Ultimately, the tribunal rendered a wide 
range of verdicts from death sentences to acquittals.133  However, 
questions yet remain as to whether Justice Jackson’s ideal of fairness 
was obtained or whether bias nevertheless crept into the system.134  
Regardless, the Nuremberg trials illustrate that bias suppression de-
mands neutral justice that is not driven by unbridled retribution, po-
litical power, or crisis-based fear.   
Under the current detention regime, there appears to be little in 
the way of procedural guarantees to prevent the U.S. government 
from using indefinite detentions to subvert justice.  In the event that 
a detainee is put on trial, the evidence is evaluated and a decision is 
reached as to whether that individual will be held or released.  How-
ever, when no such trial takes place, the detainee can be held without 
an evaluation of the charges or evidence.  Such procedures incentiv-
ize bias against those detainees whom the United States speculates 
are “really bad” but lacks the evidence to convict.  Similarly, during 
precarious periods there is a subtle motivation to keep all the alleged 
“bad guys” off the streets for long enough to turn the tide of the war 
effort.  Perhaps there is also the cynical viewpoint that even innocent 
detainees have now mingled with actual terrorists, endured signifi-
cant mistreatment, and, thus, now pose a threat to the United States. 
One of the biggest challenges that the United States faces in the 
War on Terror is to effectively fight terrorism without simultaneous-
ly stereotyping millions of individuals associated with particular re-
ligions, nationalities, or ethnic groups.  President Obama addressed 
this issue by declaring that “[t]he United States is not, and never will 
  
130. Steyn, supra note 6, at 9–10.  
131. Id. at 9. 
132. See BRADLEY F. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 300 (1977). 
133. Id. at 151. 
134. See Amy Ross, The Body Counts: Civilian Casualties and the Crisis of Hu-
man Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS 39 (Alice Bullard ed. 2008). 
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be, at war with Islam.”135  He also noted that America’s “partnership 
with the Muslim world is critical in rolling back a fringe ideology 
that people of all faiths reject.”136  These broad policy statements set 
the right tone for the minimization of bias in detention trials.  Yet, 
more specific procedural guarantees are needed as a check on the 
potential bias of a military system driven by effectiveness rather than 
justice. 
A positive step in removing bias from detentions is increased 
process transparency.  For example, the Department of Defense has 
implemented a media-visit program at Guantanamo Bay allowing 
members of the media to tour the facilities.137  More recently, the 
Department of Defense has even gone so far as to create a “Virtual 
Tour” of the Guantanamo Bay facilities.138  Instead of seeing dark 
images of coercion chambers that one might imagine in a secretive 
detention facility, viewers are greeted with images of basketball 
courts, libraries, and medical facilities.139  This voluntary act was no 
doubt “prompted by a desire to avoid an adverse impact on societal 
perceptions of Guantanamo Bay’s organizational legitimacy.”140  
While some evidence relating to detainees is classified and should 
not be made available to the public, general information about pro-
cedures, living conditions, and the detainees themselves helps turn 
conceptions of Guantanamo Bay from a concentration camp into a 
more standard prison facility. 
Another way to remove bias from a system is to introduce checks 
and balances to govern the process as proposed by the DTC model.  
Here, all three branches are involved in the judicial process as the 
President is given the authority to nominate DTC judges while the 
Senate retains the power to confirm them.  While current U.S. deten-
tion procedures were originally enacted by the executive branch with 
  
135. Mark Tran, US Is Not at War with Islam, Says Barack Obama, GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/06/barack-obama-
turkey-armenia. 
136. Id. 
137. McNeal, supra note 55, at 975–76. 
138. Virtual Tour—Camp Five, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO, 
http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/virtualvisit/camp_5.html (last visited Feb. 17, 
2011). 
139. Id. 
140. McNeal, supra note 55 at 977. 
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little congressional or judicial oversight, clear rules for each branch 
of government are laid out by the DTC model.141  For example, the 
executive branch is responsible for setting the criteria for a formal 
vetting process used by judges to determine who should be de-
tained.142  Transparency combined with this system of checks and 
balances helps to prevent one branch of government from having too 
much of a vested interest in a particular outcome and allows the ap-
pointment of qualified judges to make unbiased judgments based on 
evidence and not prejudice.  By minimizing bias, a major roadblock 
to reaching accurate decisions is cleared.  
C.  Accuracy 
Accuracy requires that decisions be made using correct informa-
tion.  For example, the U.S. criminal justice system prevents indi-
viduals from being convicted on mere speculation.  Instead, a formal 
process in which evidence is introduced and testimony is recorded 
ensures that an informed decision will ultimately be reached.  How-
ever, obtaining accurate information about hundreds of individuals 
captured all over the globe presents an overwhelming obstacle to 
traditional rules of evidence.  In contrast, the specialization of the 
DTC model makes it well suited to handle classified evidence, con-
frontation clause requirements, and other unique evidentiary prob-
lems faced in detainee trials. 
Currently, evidentiary issues remain a significant problem, as 
even the somewhat lax standards of U.S. military tribunals have 
proved difficult to meet.143   To date, hundreds of Guantanamo Bay 
detainees have been released without charges.144  In fact, one of the 
challenges delaying President Obama’s plan to shut down Guanta-
namo Bay within one year of taking office is the lack of comprehen-
  
141. See id. at 992–93. 
142. Guiora, supra note 37, at 619. 
143. See, e.g., Christopher Flavelle, You Can Check Out Anytime You Like, But 
You Can Never Leave: At Least 17 Detainees Have Been Ordered Released from 
Guantanamo But are Stuck There, SLATE (Oct. 12, 2009), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2232000/. 
144. See generally USA: Detainees Continue to Bear the Costs of Delay and Lack 
of Remedy, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.amnestyusa.org/docu 
ment.php?id=ENGAMR510502009&lang=e. 
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sive files on detainees.145  The Obama Administration recently de-
clared that it plans to charge approximately fifty of the roughly 250 
remaining detainees and set the other 200 free.146  On the one hand, 
this broad net is subjecting about four “innocent” individuals to pro-
longed detention for every individual that will be tried.  On the other 
hand, at least some degree of accuracy is eventually being reached in 
which a large number of individuals are being set free by the U.S. 
government. 
To address the evidentiary problems involved in prosecuting de-
tainees, the DTC model requires that 
the judge will wear two hats: one as the court and the other as 
defense counsel.  The information and the source must be 
held to be: (1) reliable; (2) viable; (3) valid; and (4) corrobo-
rated.  If the intelligence meets the four-part test, then and 
only then is it admissible and available for use against the de-
fendant at trial.  However, a defendant’s conviction may not 
be based solely on confidential intelligence information.147 
Thus, while the DTC model necessarily allows admission of cer-
tain evidence that would not be admitted in a traditional criminal 
court, it does so only when this evidence meets specific assurances 
of accuracy in the eyes of a judge who is cognizant of the defen-
dant’s interests.  Yet, since accuracy is never guaranteed, correctabil-
ity is the next important element of procedural justice. 
D.  Correctability  
Correctability requires the availability of procedures to correct 
unfair or inaccurate decisions.148  The idea of multiple layers of ap-
peal is fundamental to U.S. criminal law.149  However, the applica-
tion of this right to detainees has led to a lengthy foray between the 
President, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court that only recently 
  
145. Id. 
146. Peter Baker, Obama to Use Current Law to Support Detentions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 23, 2009, at A23. 
147. Guiora, supra note 37, at 631. 
148. See TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra note 52, at 119. 
149. See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 10. 
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appears to have been resolved.  The constitutional concept of habeas 
corpus requires that a court inquire into the legitimacy of a detai-
nee’s custody and brings up an important correctability issue as to 
whether only a final outcome (as opposed to the detention itself) can 
be appealed.  If a detainee must wait to be charged and tried, a fun-
damental correctability problem exists when he or she is held for a 
significant period of time without legal recourse. 
A brief overview of the habeas corpus battle begins with a Presi-
dential Military Order issued on November 13, 2001 by President 
Bush, asserting that unlawful “enemy combatants” may be held inde-
finitely without charges or a court hearing.150  However, in the 2004 
case Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that de-
fendants who are U.S. citizens have a right to habeas corpus protec-
tions.151  This led Congress to enact the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005152 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006,153  which again 
stripped the habeas corpus rights from detainees and asserted that 
they had no right of appeal.154  In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court 
fired back in Boumediene v. Bush, holding the Detainee Treatment 
Act unconstitutional and declaring that detainees have a right to seek 
a writ of habeas corpus in U.S. Federal Court.155  On January 21, 
2009, President Obama affirmed this right of appeal in an executive 
order.156 
In Boumediene, the Court overturned the notion “that the Consti-
tution as a whole offers substantially less protection against Ameri-
can tyranny to foreigners than it does to America’s own citizens.”157  
As a result, detainees can now appeal not only the final verdict they 
receive but also the government’s right to hold them.158  The seven-
year debate described above is itself an important illustration of the 
principle of correctability, as each branch of government worked to 
  
150. See Dworkin, supra note 110, at 2. 
151. See id. 
152. Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (2005). 
153. Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (2006) (amended 2009). 
154. See Dworkin, supra note 110, at 2. 
155. See id. 
156. Mark Mazzetti & William Glaberson, Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down 
Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at A1. 
157. Dworkin, supra note 110, at 2. 
158. Id. 
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overturn the decision of another branch until an appropriate solution 
was finally reached by all three branches. 
Under the DTC model, detainee appeals are filed directly to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals.159  The DTC model also mirrors certain pro-
cedures implemented by Israel and the United Kingdom in which the 
classified information holding a detainee is subject to periodic re-
view.160  This policy ensures that correctability cannot be side-
stepped by indefinite detention.  Thus, the justification for an indi-
vidual’s detention must be continually evaluated and his or her pro-
cedural rights cannot be indefinitely waived. 
E.  Representativeness 
Representativeness means “that the concerns of those affected 
should be represented in all phases of the allocation process.”161  In 
this context, I suggest that representativeness involves the extent to 
which the individual detainee’s concerns and interests are 
represented.  Procedures that provide legal representation to detai-
nees are one example of how this principle has been applied.  This 
element is critical in the Global War on Terror in which broad gov-
ernment concerns about terrorism readily overshadow the interests of 
the individual. 
I suggest that detainee representativeness occurs both internally 
(by citizens of the United States) and externally (by citizens of other 
nations).  However, there is an important legitimacy distinction be-
tween these two sources of representation.  Only when a government 
internally limits its own self-interest to look out for the interests of 
the individual can representativeness enhance legitimacy.  Thus, 
while an attorney (internal) who vigorously defends the rights of a 
detainee probably enhances global perceptions of U.S. legitimacy, a 
report by Amnesty International (external) arguing for detainee 
rights is likely to reduce perceptions of U.S. legitimacy.  Although 
non-governmental organizations, foreign governments, and citizens 
of other nations are all concerned about detainees’ interests, only an 
internally manifested concern by U.S. citizens and political leaders 
  
159. See Guiora, supra note 37, at 632. 
160. See id. at 619. 
161. See TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra note 52, at 118. 
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can enhance perceptions of legitimacy.  While America’s longstand-
ing commitment to individual rights and liberties has been shaken by 
9/11,162 it appears that these values are beginning to reemerge. 
The DTC model upholds the principle of representativeness by 
requiring a “degree of government self-restraint.”163  If an individual 
is held, the purpose of the detention is to indict and prepare for trial, 
as opposed to an indefinite substitute for justice.  By granting detai-
nees certain rights, and by requiring judges to look out for these 
rights, the principle of representativeness is upheld and the individu-
al is not overlooked in the midst of a global conflict. 
F.  Ethicality 
Ethicality means “the degree to which the decision-making 
process accords with general standards of fairness and morality.”164  
Thus, conduct such as bribery, spying, and deception are all widely 
recognized as violating general standards of fairness.165  However, 
ethicality is the most difficult rule to define in the context of terror-
ism because there is an inherent tension between individual stan-
dards of morality, the laws of nations, and international laws and 
customs.  Crisis exacerbates these tensions, as moral and legal stan-
dards often appear to be at odds with effectiveness and necessity.  
The use of torture and other coercive measures against detainees 
provides a vivid illustration of this conflict that will be discussed 
later in more detail.  However, the use of torture is but one example 
of a failure to take the “moral high ground” in the War on Terror.166  
When the United States acts unilaterally or declines to follow the 
laws governing international conflict, it loses the moral high ground 
that ideologically separates legitimate governments from terrorist 
organizations that ignore the rule of law.  Once on the same moral 
ground as the terrorists, the United States can no longer rely on legi-
  
162. THREAT OF A BAD EXAMPLE, supra note 47, at 1. 
163. Lunday & Rishikof, supra note 2, at 101. 
164. See TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra note 52, at 119. 
165. See id. 
166. Gerard P. Fogarty, Guantanamo Bay—Undermining the Global War on Ter-
ror, U.S. ARMY WAR C. 10 (2005), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Lo 
cation=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA434467.  
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timacy but must focus entirely on coercion and force in a “might 
makes right” scenario rather than utilizing legitimacy’s more effec-
tive “right makes might” paradigm of voluntary compliance. 
While ethicality invokes moral arguments and may rightly be 
considered an end in itself, this paper constrains ethicality by primar-
ily analyzing only the extent to which it enhances procedural justice 
and legitimacy.  Ethical treatment of detainees is not merely a moral 
obligation, but also a strategic choice.167  Consider Sherman et al.’s 
observation:  
One of the most striking recent findings is the extent to 
which the police themselves create a risk factor for crime 
simply by using bad manners.  Modest but consistent scien-
tific evidence supports the hypothesis that the less respectful 
police are towards suspects and citizens generally, the less 
people will comply with the law.168  
Similarly, the U.S. military puts itself in harm’s way when it 
fails to follow international rules of war.  “Guantanamo has become 
a liability.  The real and perceived injustices occurring there have 
given our enemies an easy example of our failures and alleged ill 
intent,” stated Homeland Security Committee member Rep. Jane 
Harman.169  The graphic beheading of U.S. citizen Nicholas Berg is 
one of many retaliatory attacks by terrorist groups in response to 
perceived abuses of their captured associates.170  Justified or not, 
terrorist groups often claim that immoral U.S. conduct has legiti-
mized their actions.171 
One of the most heated debates about the treatment of detainees 
surrounds the use of torture and other methods of coercion to extract 
  
167. See generally Lunday & Rishikof, supra note 2, at 87. 
168. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING 
CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T, WHAT’S PROMISING, at ch. 8 (1997), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/works/wholedoc.htm. 
169. Michael Roston, Congress Members Sponsor Bill to Shutter Guantanamo 
Bay, RAW STORY (May 8, 2007), http://rawstory.com/news/2007/Congress_ mem-
bers_sponsor_bill_to_shutter_0508.html.  
170. John O’Sullivan, Left Eye’s View: Seeing Through the Abu Ghraib Cover-
age, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 18, 2004), http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
jos/jos2004 05181427.asp.  
171. See id.   
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information from detainees.  President Obama’s decision to ban cer-
tain types of torture, such as waterboarding, reflects his belief that 
the United States lost its “moral bearing” by utilizing such practic-
es.172  Empirical evidence similarly reveals that America lost legiti-
macy through the torture of alleged terrorists.  A 2006 poll of more 
than 27,000 individuals in twenty-five different countries indicated 
that 59% of respondents felt that clear rules against torture should be 
maintained, while 29% said governments should be allowed to use 
some degree of torture.173  Opposition to torture was strongest in 
Western Europe, Canada, and Australia, with approximately three-
quarters of individuals in these regions opposing torture.174   
In contrast, the United States was more divided, as 58% of citi-
zens opposed torture while 36% indicated that some degree of tor-
ture should be allowed.175  Going back to the earlier discussion about 
the tendency for governments to overreact during periods of crisis, it 
is interesting to note that countries that have experienced recent ter-
rorist attacks or political violence are, on average, more willing to 
allow torture.176  Even though all twenty-five countries that partici-
pated in this survey are parties to the Geneva Convention, which  
forbids torture under Common Article 3 and the more recent Con-
vention Against Torture, these findings provide evidence that nations 
are increasingly likely to jettison not only traditional rules of law but 
also ethical standards when under attack.177 
Even as the debate over torture begins to wind down (now that 
the practice has been explicitly outlawed by President Obama), there 
remains an apprehension about the extent to which the “[p]rocess is 
  
172. David Gardner, U.S. Lost Its Moral Bearing Over Torture, Says Obama—
and Warns Bush Officials Could Be Charged, MAILONLINE (April 21, 2009), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1172239/U-S-lost-moral-
bearings-torture-says-Obama--warns-Bush-officials-charged.html.  
173. Press Release, BBC World Service, World Citizens Reject Torture, Global 
Poll Reveals 1 (2006), http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbctorture06. 
174. See id. at 3. 
175. Id. at 1. 
176. Id. at 2. 
177. Id. at 2 (noting that India has signed, but not ratified, the Convention Against 
Torture). 
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the [p]unishment” in the context of detentions.178  I borrow this 
phrase from Brenda Sims Blackwell and Clark D. Cunningham, who 
documented a number of criminal cases in which individuals spent 
up to twelve days in jail for minor offenses such as jaywalking be-
fore their cases could be resolved.179  However, this concept is mag-
nified in the context of detentions.  When an individual is taken from 
his or her homeland and placed in Guantanamo Bay for an indefinite 
period, the punishment, independent of ultimate guilt or innocence, 
has already begun.  This is particularly salient because, as mentioned 
previously within the discussion of accuracy, U.S. detention proce-
dures result in the roundup of a significant number of “innocent” 
individuals that is well in excess of those whom will ultimately be 
tried and convicted.  Add potential mistreatment, coercion, and de-
pravation, and suddenly the treatment of uncharged detainees looks 
worse than the lifestyle afforded many convicted criminals.  In a 
legal system that presumes guilt, this outcome might be an accepta-
ble reality.  However, it stands in stark contrast to the constitutional 
notion of innocent until proven guilty. 
A consideration of ethicality reveals several ways in which pro-
cedural justice can be enhanced by the DTC model.  First, the DTC 
model sets clear ethical limits against “unconstitutional interrogation 
methods . . . which are illegal, immoral, and do not contribute to ‘ac-
tionable intelligence.’”180  Not only is torture prohibited, but evi-
dence obtained through torture is excluded from trial.181  I address 
this apparent tradeoff between effectiveness and fairness later in 
more detail, by arguing that this evidence is not only of questionable 
reliability but comes at too high a cost to the United States.  By set-
ting moral boundaries, the United States is in a better position to 
avoid the sorts of prisoner abuse scandals that have occurred at Abu 
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay which have significantly undermined 
U.S. legitimacy. 
  
178. See Brenda Sims Blackwell & Clark D. Cunningham, Taking the Punishment 
Out of the Process: From Substantive Criminal Justice Through Procedural Jus-
tice to Restorative Justice, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 60 (2004). 
179. Id. at 59–60. 
180. Guiora, supra note 37, at 628. 
181. Id. 
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Second, a re-articulation of detention policies under the DTC 
model will limit procedural burdens on detainees to a greater degree.  
The DTC model requires that detainees be brought before a judge 
without unnecessary delay.182  This should occur within seven days 
unless exigent circumstances arise.183  Detentions must be indepen-
dently reviewed at periodic intervals to ensure that the process is 
progressing either toward trial or release.184  Fairness and efficiency 
are maximized by a system adapted specifically to detainees, and 
holding individuals for years without trial would become the rare 
exception under this model rather than the norm. 
Third, the DTC model is but one aspect of a broader strategic ob-
jective designed to retake the moral high ground in the War on Ter-
ror.  While the United States has frequently asserted its sovereignty 
in opposition to international law,185  it would gain much through 
international cooperation as opposed to unilateral action.  While an 
extensive discussion of the limits of state sovereignty is beyond the 
scope of this paper, the United States should consider the legitimacy 
of international laws and customs even in situations where it has the 
power to go against global norms.  By recognizing these universal 
principles of procedural fairness, the United States gains legitimacy 
in the War on Terror. 
VII.   BALANCING FAIRNESS, EFFECTIVENESS, AND EFFICIENCY 
Although enhancing procedural justice is critical to U.S. success 
in the War on Terror, fairness is not an absolute and must be careful-
ly balanced with other strategic objectives including effectiveness 
and efficiency.  Yet, weighing these elements is not inherently a ze-
ro-sum game in which one objective can only be maximized at the 
expense of the others.  While some degree of balance is required, a 
zero-sum mentality is often the result of short-term thinking as op-
posed to long-term strategy.  In this section, I argue that the DTC 
  
182. Id. at 627. 
183. Id. at 626–27. 
184. See id. at 619.  
185. See, e.g., Letta Tayler, U.S. at Odds over World Tribunal, NEWSDAY 1–6 
(Oct. 17, 2004), http://www.amicc.org/docs/Newsday%2010-17-04.pdf. 
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model collectively maximizes effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness 
to a greater extent than either the current U.S. detention regime or 
competing detention models.  I also caution against the misuse of 
procedural justice and legitimacy to present a front of credibility that 
is used to manipulate and exploit individuals. 
A.  Efficiency 
The DTC model represents a method of bringing efficiency and 
fairness to the detention system.  Efficiency suggests that with li-
mited resources, procedural protections cannot be an absolute.  Yet, 
some unfair policies with a guise of efficiency, like a shoot-on-sight 
policy against suspected terrorists, would actually be incredibly cost-
ly when long-term effects on U.S. legitimacy are considered.  At the 
other end of the spectrum, the trial of thousands of suspected terror-
ists under the U.S. criminal model is also tremendously ineffi-
cient.186  Implementing traditional evidence and jury requirements 
would be extremely costly and would create significant delays.  Crit-
ics of Article III courts and international treaty-based terror courts 
note the impracticability and inefficiency of this system in the con-
text of terrorism.187 
Referring back to the problem of “the process as the punish-
ment,” weighing the additional delays and complications required 
under alternate models such as the traditional criminal justice system 
eclipses the marginal benefit of any additional rights provided by 
these models.  Under the DTC model, efficiency and fairness work 
together, as both the detainee and the United States have an interest 
in expediting the judicial process.  Of course, resources could be 
poured into the criminal system to allow a significantly larger casel-
oad, yet, the proposed DTC model strikes a more suitable balance 
between efficiency and fairness that does not stretch either of these 
ideals beyond the point of diminishing returns.  Just as judicial sta-
tutes allow courts to efficiently provide justice without reinventing 
the wheel on a case-by-case basis, the DTC framework is an efficient 
alternative to current ad hoc policies used to try terrorists. 
  
186. See, e.g., Guiora, supra note 37, at 620.  
187. See, e.g., id.  
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B.  Effectiveness 
While short-term effectiveness often appears to be hampered by 
fair process, procedural justice and legitimacy are the building 
blocks of long-term effectiveness in the War on Terror.  The famous 
ticking time bomb scenario, in which a terrorist is apprehended after 
hiding a bomb, is often used as an example justifying torture (proce-
dural injustice) in the name of effectiveness.  Choosing not to torture 
the suspected terrorist appears to compromise effectiveness and po-
tentially sentence thousands of innocent civilians to death.  Torture 
supporters argue that in such a situation the ends justify the means.  
However, substantial evidence suggests that torture marks the begin-
ning of a slippery slope that ultimately undermines both fairness and 
effectiveness.188 
Before analyzing the scenario itself, it is worth noting the impro-
bability of a situation in which the terrorist is apprehended during 
this short window of time by government agents who understand the 
plot, but do not yet have enough information to find the bomb.189  
While television dramas frequently show the capture of a terrorist 
immediately before a massive attack, the reality is that such a situa-
tion is highly unlikely.190  Yet, even in such a scenario, experts ques-
tion the assumption that torture will be the most effective way to get 
information from this individual.191  Professor John Langbein notes 
that, “[h]istory’s most important lesson is that it has not been possi-
ble to make coercion compatible with truth.”192  Similarly, empirical 
evidence suggests that 
[e]ven if the terrorist begins to talk under torture, interroga-
tors have a hard time figuring out whether he is telling the 
truth or not.  Testing has found that professional interrogators 
  
188. Amos N. Guiora, Military Commissions and National Security Courts After 
Guantanamo, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 199, 201 (2008). 
189. See Alfred W. McCoy, The Myth of the Ticking Time Bomb, PROGRESSIVE 
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perform within the 45 to 60% range in separating truth from 
lies—little better than flipping a coin.193  
Next, this approach is problematic because it casts a wide net 
that potentially allows the torture of anyone that may have some 
knowledge of the bomb.194  “[Y]ou end up going down a slippery 
slope and sanctioning torture in general,” states Professor David 
Cole.195  With the lives of thousands of individuals on the line, how 
far should this individual be tortured?  Are any means off limits in 
such a scenario?  What if torturing the alleged terrorist does not pro-
duce results, but it is suspected that this individual will talk if the 
government tortures his six-year-old daughter in front of him?  In-
evitably, the ticking time bomb scenario leads full circle back to 
questions about legitimacy and fairness.  If the United States is will-
ing to venture down this slippery slope, it will, as the United States 
Army Field Manual section on torture indicates, “bring discredit 
upon the U.S. and its armed forces while undermining domestic and 
international support for the war effort.”196 
While this scenario represents the extreme example, all attempts 
to circumvent fairness in the name of effectiveness inevitably begin 
to move down this slippery slope.  In a regime without clear rules, 
effectiveness becomes subsumed in necessity, and in a period of cri-
sis, long-term costs are easily overshadowed by perceived short-term 
gains.  It is possible to conceptualize a regime in which bureaucratic 
procedural red tape ties the hands of the military to a point where 
effectiveness is undermined.  However, this is not the lesson of the 
last seven years.  In contrast, U.S. policymakers are seeking to set 
rules and limits on a regime that has run largely unregulated and un-
checked in the War on Terror.197  The DTC model maintains effec-
tiveness by recognizing inherent differences between suspected ter-
rorists and domestic criminals.  Yet, it also enhances fairness by 




195. McCoy, supra note 189. 
196. Id. 
197. David Abraham, The Bush Regime from Elections to Detentions: A Moral 
Economy of Carl Schmitt and Human Rights, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249, 267 
(2008). 
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DTC model, if Osama bin Laden was captured today, he would not 
receive a full Miranda warning or be immediately brought to trial 
before a jury, as a domestic criminal defendant would be.  Yet, he 
also would not be indefinitely placed in a “black hole” but would be 
brought before a judge within seven days.  He would be guaranteed 
certain rights that would allow non-abusive interrogation but not 
torture.  Regardless of whether valuable information is obtained 
through questioning, to go beyond the rules in this scenario would 
ultimately undermine both effectiveness and fairness in the long 
term.  The DTC model establishes the correct balance by providing 
the tools to convict bin Laden without losing sight of his rights as a 
human being.  In the eyes of a global audience, this model of guaran-
teed rules and rights enhances both legitimacy and long-term effec-
tiveness in the War on Terror. 
C.  The Limits of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy 
An important limitation of legitimacy is that it “does not address 
normative issues concerning whether people ought to defer to legal 
authorities and generally obey the law.”198  Thus, while legitimacy 
offers a way for the United States to obtain compliance with its poli-
cies, legitimacy fails to address whether these policies are inherently 
good or bad.  Under a corrupt regime, legitimacy has the power to 
manipulate and exploit individuals by overshadowing questionable 
outcomes under the guise of fair process.199  While recognizing that 
legitimacy and procedural justice can combat extremism, protect 
individual rights, and promote worldwide peace, they can also be 
misconstrued to achieve less desirable outcomes.  Thus, while this 
paper has focused almost exclusively on process, we must ultimately 
also consider whether the outcomes derived from a given process 
align with the values that we want to pursue. 
  
198. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 
30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 285 (2003). 
199. See MacCoun, supra note 7, at 189–90. 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The War on Terrorism is an ideological struggle that can only be 
won through legitimizing the rule of law and undermining extrem-
ism.  While governments often overreact in periods of crisis by 
trampling individual rights in the name of national security, govern-
mental excess undermines the principle of legitimacy.  In the context 
of terrorism, legitimacy, rather than deterrence, is primarily what 
shapes compliance with government policies.  The DTC model en-
hances perceptions of legitimacy by providing a procedurally fair 
process designed specifically to try detainees.  By properly balancing 
fairness, effectiveness, and efficiency, this model provides a worka-
ble solution that is better suited to the unique challenges involved in 
trying suspected terrorists than the vague standards employed by the 
current U.S. detention regime. 
 
